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To pay for their spending, governments use
one or more of the following: taxes, sale of debt
to the public, and money creation. Taxes and
debt issuance are typically under the purview of
the treasury (the government’s fiscal side), and
money creation is under the control of the central
bank (the government’s monetary side). This split
seems natural since most central banks are
required to maintain price stability and, hence,
ought to have complete control over the money
supply. In recent years, however, based on the
work of Christ (1968) and Sargent and Wallace
(1981), economists have noted that a single, for-
ward-looking budget constraint unifies these two
government branches. As a direct consequence
of this constraint, every fiscal action potentially
has a monetary component to it, and vice versa.
As such, it becomes hard to pinpoint whether the
central bank really has complete control over
money creation or whether it is passively creating
money at the treasury’s beck and call. If the latter
is true, the central bank is severely constrained in
performing its task of maintaining price stability.
Or is it? This article presents a model in which the
central bank retains substantial control over the
inflation rate despite being subservient to the
treasury in a very precise sense.
We consider a situation in which the gov-
ernment explicitly relies on the central bank to
meet a portion of the government’s revenue
needs. More precisely, our measure of this re-
liance captures the extent to which the central
bank is required to raise revenue from money
creation (seigniorage) to pay for the interest
expenses on the debt floated by the treasury.
Greater reliance implies that seigniorage ac-
counts for a larger fraction of the treasury’s rev-
enue requirements brought on by its outstand-
ing interest obligations. This notion of reliance
stems from the idea of “economic independence” as
described by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini
(1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), and Capie
et al. (1994). Capie et al., for instance, differenti-
ate between goal independence and instrument
independence. Goal independence exists when
the central bank can choose what it wants mon-
etary policy to accomplish without regard to the
treasury’s or other policymakers’ desires.
1 Instru-
ment independence is present when the central
bank can choose how to use the instrument of mon-
etary policy without regard to the treasury’s wishes.
2
In contrast, our measure of reliance has 
little connection with the idea of goal indepen-
dence. Interestingly, as Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991) point out, goal independence and
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In this article, the central bank is (possi-
bly) goal independent although it is not instru-
ment independent because it has to raise a cer-
tain amount of revenue for the government. As
such, it is constrained in its choice of, say, the
money growth rate. It does, however, have con-
trol over the composition of government liabili-
ties, namely debt versus money. Our question,
then, is: Does the control over the composition
of government “paper” translate into control
over the inflation rate even when the central
bank is not instrument independent in the sense
of Capie et al. (1994)?
To get a sense of some of the issues
involved, consider the case of a government
that floats some debt on the market to, partly,
finance its expenditures. The government must
credibly demonstrate the presence of enough
funds to cover the principal and interest pay-
ments on all debt held by the public. Using the
government’s long-run budget constraint, it is
possible to show that having a current out-
standing debt requires the government to run
surpluses in the future. These surpluses may be
generated by cutting expenditures, implement-
ing taxes, or altering the revenue from money
creation, or seigniorage.
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We are particularly interested in seignior-
age. The central bank may print money to pay
for the treasury’s interest expenses or exchange
new money for existing government bonds. In
the case of an open market purchase, in which
the central bank buys government bonds and
gives money to the public, the stock of money
in the economy goes up but the interest ex-
pense of the debt goes down. Because money
does not pay interest, future taxes may go
down. This may reduce the government’s reve-
nue needs, such that the central bank has more
control over the inflation rate. Thus, the central
bank, even though it is not independent, can,
via open market operations, control the compo-
sition of government paper, thereby affecting
the government’s de facto reliance on seignior-
age (and indirectly the inflation rate).
This article illustrates some of these basic
ideas within the context of a well-specified gen-
eral equilibrium model in the tradition of
Sidrauski (1967). In our model, a large number
of infinitely lived households with 20/20 fore-
sight derive utility from the consumption of a
single nonproduced perishable good and from
liquidity services (money). The government
sells bonds and prints money to cover its in-
terest obligations on these bonds. The central
bank is not economically independent; in fact,
the government explicitly relies on the central
bank to raise a fraction of its interest expenses
on outstanding debt (henceforth the reliance
parameter).
First, we analyze the long-run relationship
between this reliance parameter and the price
level, the inflation rate, and the nominal interest
rate. In other words, we attempt to answer the
question: Do countries that rely heavily on
seigniorage endure higher long-run inflation
rates in comparison with countries with less
seigniorage? Second, we examine the relation-
ship between the composition of government
paper—bonds versus money—and the effects
on the price level, the inflation rate, and the
nominal interest rate. This inquiry may be of
topical interest in that more and more govern-
ments are realizing primary surpluses and pay-
ing off some outstanding debt. Insofar as these
surpluses translate into permanent changes in
the composition of government paper, we ask
how such a change would affect the long-run
values of these economic variables.
The two main results are easily summa-
rized. First, we show that the price level is posi-
tively related to the stock of government debt as
long as the government relies on the central
bank to raise some revenue. This reliance re-
quires the central bank to monetize some of the
outstanding debt. Consequently, the treasury’s
debt decisions affect the price level. In short, the
price level has a “fiscal” aspect. Viewed another
way, the effective stock of money in the econ-
omy consists of the actual quantity of money
and the fraction of bonds backed by money.
Second, we derive the impact of perma-
nent changes in both the reliance and the com-
position parameters on the long-run inflation
rate. We show that the inflation is positively re-
lated to the government’s reliance on seignior-
age and is inversely related to the composition
of government paper. When the latter shifts
toward money, government debt falls, imply-
ing that the government’s expenses are smaller.
Hence, less seigniorage is required.
The chief policy lesson is that an economi-
cally dependent central bank, via its ability to
control the composition of government paper,
may be quite successful in controlling the infla-
tion rate.
5
We begin by laying out the details of the
model economy.
THE MODEL ECONOMY
The economy is populated by a large
number of dynastic (infinitely lived) house-
holds. Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 22
2, 3…. There is a single, perishable consump-
tion good. At each date t ≥ 1, a household
receives a fixed endowment of y units of the
single consumption good; it does not have to
exert any effort to produce or receive this good.
Households may hold their wealth two
ways: government bonds and fiat money. Both
assets are nominally denominated (in, say, dol-
lars). Government bonds mature one period
after they are issued. If the household pays $1
for a unit of government debt at date t, it
receives $I at date t + 1. In contrast, no interest
is paid on money. At date t = 1, each household
is endowed with $B0 and $M0.
At the start of any period, a representative
household’s wealth comprises three entities: the
proceeds from the sale of its endowment of y
goods, its money holdings from the previous
period (whose value, as we will see, may have
gone up or down depending on inflation), and
the interest (plus principal) payments on its
bond holdings from the previous period. The
household may use this wealth to provide for its
consumption during that period, buy new
bonds and money, and pay a lump-sum tax to
the government.
The household’s budget constraint, there-
fore, is
(1) pty + Mt–1 + It–1Bt–1 = ptct + Mt + Bt + ptτ t,
where p is the price level measuring the num-
ber of dollars traded for one unit of the con-
sumption good, M is the quantity of money, B
is the quantity of government bonds, τ is the
lump-sum tax, and c is consumption. Equation
1 stipulates that the dollar value of the house-
hold’s after-tax resources must equal the dollar
value of its expenditures, including savings.
It is possible, and instructive, to convert
the household’s budget constraint (written in
dollar terms in Equation 1) to its goods value.  
To do this, let  
Here, π stands for the rate of change in the price
level over time, or the inflation rate; i is the net
nominal interest rate; r is the net real interest
rate; and R is the gross real interest rate (princi-
pal plus interest). Divide both sides of Equation
1 by pt to obtain













































where m denotes the real value of money bal-
ances and b the real value of government
bonds. Equation 2 states the household’s budget
constraint—both sources of income and expen-
ditures—measured in units of the consumption
good. Note that b can be either positive or neg-
ative. With b > 0, the government is borrowing
from the household. With b < 0, the government
is loaning resources to households.
The left side of Equation 2 represents the
resources the household has available to spend
at date t. Given these resources, how much con-
sumption can this household afford at the mar-
ket price? How much money and bonds should
it hold? We now turn to a determination of the
household’s demand for consumption, money,
and bonds. We study an equilibrium in which
the demands for all three are positive. A prob-
lem we face in this environment is that money
is dominated in rate of return by government
bonds, and, hence, households will not hold
money unless we build into the model some
rationale for money to be demanded.
Possibly the simplest way to achieve our
purpose is to assume the household has prefer-
ences defined over the consumption good and
real money balances. In other words, house-
holds value liquidity directly and are willing to
alter their consumption to get the desired
amount of liquidity. We are not arguing that
households derive happiness from holding in-
trinsically worthless pieces of paper. Rather, the
fact that money facilitates market exchange
makes it relatively more attractive than bonds
and accounts for why the latter are not also in
the utility function. We do not explicitly model
how and why money is more liquid than bonds.
Suffice it to say that money-in-the-utility-func-
tion is a general formulation that encompasses
many deeper reasons why fiat money is valued
in the real world despite being dominated in
rate of return.
6
For expositional convenience, the repre-
sentative household’s preferences at date t are
represented as
(3) U(ct,mt) = lnct + θ lnmt,
where θ is the rate at which a household will sub-
stitute money for consumption. Equation 3 spec-
ifies that the household’s utility is characterized
in a log-separable form. Three properties of the
function U(.) are worth noting. First, the house-
hold’s utility increases when either consumption
or real money balances increase. In other words,
marginal utility is positive with respect to each
variable. Second, an increase in consumption
results in declining marginal utility. Third, separa-23 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2000
bility means a household’s marginal utility of con-
sumption is invariant to changes in real money
balances, and vice versa.
The government consists of two separate
entities bound by a single budget constraint.
The fiscal authority, or treasury, collects the
lump-sum taxes and sells and redeems bonds. 
It has no other expenditures. Simultaneously,
the monetary authority, or central bank, poten-
tially controls the nominal quantity of money
over time. It can alter the quantity of money 
by directly handing money over to each house-
hold; alternatively, it could trade money for an
equal dollar value of government bonds—an
open market operation. Changes in the nominal
money stock allow the government to buy goods
with the extra money printed. Each authority
operates in such a way that the following budget
constraint is satisfied period by period:
(4) (1 + rt–1)bt–1 = τ t + bt + st,
where s denotes the seigniorage raised by the
central bank.
Conceivably, the treasury could keep issu-
ing new debt to pay for the interest obligations
on outstanding debt but never really retire the
debt, thus rolling it over forever. Forward-look-
ing agents will understand this and refuse to
lend to the treasury. Hence, we must impose an
additional long-run restriction on the treasury’s
debt issuance. Specifically, as we show in the
box entitled “The Long-Run Government Budget
Constraint,” the present value of government
revenues must be equal to the initial stock of
the treasury’s real bond payments. More con-
cretely, the present value of the treasury’s debt
must equal the present value of government
revenues (that is, future debt obligations must
be fully backed by future revenues of the 
treasury and the central bank). Thus, the treas-
ury is restricted to be neither a lender nor a bor-
rower, at least in terms of the present value of
its debt obligations. This policy is sometimes
referred to as a no-Ponzi condition.
We now introduce the notion of reliance.
Since each authority contributes to the present
value of revenues, we can assign the contribu-
tion from each. Reliance, therefore, represents
the portion of the present value of revenues that
must come from each authority:
(5) PV(τ t) = (1 – φ )(1 + rt–1)bt–1,
and
(6) PV(st) = φ (1 + rt–1)bt–1,
where PV stands for the present value of the
term in parentheses. In other words, the present
The Long-Run Government Budget Constraint
In this box we formally derive the government’s long-run budget constraint.
There are principal and interest expenses associated with outstanding government
debt.These expenses are backed by the revenues from taxes and seigniorage.
We begin with the period-by-period expression of the government budget
constraint; that is, at date t
(B.1) (1 + rt–1)bt–1 = τ t + bt + st.
At date t + 1, Equation B.1 is written as
(B.2) (1 + rt)bt = τ t+1 + bt+1 + st+1.
Thus, the date t level of government debt is
Substitute for bt in Equation B.1, yielding
Next, update Equation B.1 two periods, solving for bt+1 and substituting in Equation
B.3, yielding
By repeating this process, we get the following expression
where
Equation B.4 states that the government’s principal and interest expense is equal to
the sum of the present value of its tax revenues, its seigniorage and its long-run debt
position. We impose the condition that the treasury cannot roll over its debt (or loans)
forever.The standard no-Ponzi condition is represented by the following expression:
Thus, the no-Ponzi condition implies that the government’s date t principal and
interest expenses are backed completely by tax revenues and seigniorage.
Now that we have defined our notion of backing, we can articulate our notion of
reliance. Suppose the government decrees that a fraction φ of its date t debt obliga-
tions will be met by tax revenues.Thus, 
The government’s long-run budget constraint, Equation B.4, together with Equations
B.5 and B.6, implies that 
How should current taxes be set, given Equations B.6 and B.7? Recall that
Since τ t = Tt – φ bt, current taxes must satisfy
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value of lump-sum taxes and seigniorage is
equal to the principal and interest expenses of
the initial stock of real government bonds. It is
possible (see Equation B.8 in the box) to write
(7) τ t = (1 – φ )[(1 + rt–1)bt–1 – bt].
Thus, another way to think of our notion of
reliance is that current taxes are responsible for
(1 – φ ) percent of the current interest expenses
on the outstanding debt or that the central bank
is responsible for φ percent of the current inter-
est expenses. Hereafter, we refer to φ as the
seigniorage-reliance parameter.
A few remarks about measurement and
realism are in order. First, reliance is difficult to
measure because it is quite hard to isolate those
changes in the stock of high-powered money
that the central bank engineered exclusively to
finance government deficits. This is because
high-powered money could change for reasons
other than to finance deficits. Second, we have
taken a particular stand with respect to the insti-
tutional structure linking the fiscal authority and
the central bank. It is difficult to find examples
of countries that fit our environment perfectly.
As discussed in the introduction, we like to
think of φ as a continuous version of instrument
independence as postulated by Capie et al.
(1994). One could be agnostic about all this,
simply follow Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), and
refer to φ as the portion of government bonds
eventually backed by money.
In the next section, we turn our attention
to the equilibrium relationship between the
reliance parameter and the price level in our
economy.
A FISCAL THEORY OF PRICES
The household’s utility maximization
problem can be stated as
subject to Equation 2. β is a positive fraction
that measures the rate at which the household
discounts future utility. In equilibrium, the house-
hold’s maximization problem yields the follow-





































In equilibrium, since the good is perishable, the
household will consume all its endowment; that
is, ct = y for all t.
7 Substituting for c in Equa-
tion 8 and using Equation 7 to substitute for 
τ , the household’s date t budget constraint
(Equation 2) can be written as
Thus, the household’s budget constraint is char-
acterized by the size of the endowment, the
path of government bonds, the real interest rate,
the inflation rate, and the government’s long-
run reliance on taxes.
In this article, we focus only on steady-
state, or long-run, equilibria, that is, equilibrium
allocations—consumption, real money holdings,
and real bond holdings—that are time invariant.
With consumption constant across time, the 
price of date t + 1 consumption measured in
units of date t consumption is constant (see
Equation 8′ ). This price is the gross real interest
rate, (1 + r). In steady state, therefore, we know
that
Using this, we can rewrite the household’s bud-
get constraint as
Next, solve Equation 10 for real government
bonds:
Note that Equation 11 is the quantity of real
government bonds that people will hold in
equilibrium. Thus, Equations 8, 11, and c = y
completely describe the household’s steady-state
allocations.
We conduct the following experiment to
demonstrate how fiscal policy directly affects
the price level. Suppose the nominal stocks of
money and government bonds are set at their
initial levels. It is straightforward to derive the
relationship between the equilibrium steady-
state price level and seigniorage reliance.
8 We
substitute the steady-state expressions for bonds,
money, and consumption into the household’s
budget constraint (Equation 9), and after some
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To understand the deeper implications of
Equation 12, consider an increase in the central
bank’s revenue generation responsibility, φ . With
the central bank raising more revenue, the trea-
sury can reduce the household’s taxes and retire
some outstanding debt using the funds the cen-
tral bank raised. Retiring debt means that B falls.
It follows that households now have a smaller
stock of assets available. In contrast, with lower
lump-sum taxes, the household’s disposable
income rises. If φ < 1, it can be shown that the
former effect dominates. The bottom line is that
an increase in the central bank’s revenue gener-
ation responsibility raises the quantity of
resources available for the household to spend.
More resources chase the same amount of
goods. The price level rises as a consequence.
Equation 12 says the long-run price level
is proportional to the “monetized” portion of the
government’s liabilities. Note that φ represents
the long-run fraction of government bonds
backed by money. In the minds of forward-
looking agents, then, the actual amount of
money in the economy is not only the money
stock M but also the fraction of bonds backed
by money. When the latter goes up, agents see
this as an increase in the amount of money in
the economy; consequently, the price level
rises. With φ > 0, in addition to the central bank,
the treasury plays a role in determining the
price level through the quantity of government
bonds outstanding.
Equation 12 captures an idea in contrast to
the standard textbook version of the quantity
theory of money, which postulates that only
changes in the money stock affect the price
level. Here, fiscal policy actions (such as a per-
manent increase in the treasury’s stock of debt)
can easily affect the price level as long as φ < 1
holds, even though the stock of money is held
constant. Thus, when considering correlations
between the price level and money, the appro-
priate definition of money should include the
stock of debt, a point long recognized by pro-
ponents of the real bills doctrine.
9
To finance the government’s interest
expenses, the money stock will change over
time. We turn our attention to the effect that
changes in reliance and composition have on
the steady-state inflation rate and the nominal
interest rate. To that end, with c = y, the equi-
librium expression for real money demand
using Equation 8 is given by







Set this equal to real money supply M/p, where
p is computed from Equation 12.
10 After some
rearrangement, it is possible to show that
and
We now can answer our initial question:
Does increased reliance on seigniorage increase
the inflation rate? Recall that the seigniorage
reliance parameter is denoted by φ . Then, an
increase in this parameter raises the numerator
of Equation 14 and reduces the denominator,
thereby increasing π . Simply stated, an increase
in the central bank’s revenue-raising responsi-
bility precipitates an increase in the inflation
rate. Analogously, we can show (using Equation
13) that such an action increases the nominal
interest rate.
11
Note that money demand is interest-
inelastic (Equation 8). This point is important in
deriving the relationship between reliance and
both the inflation rate and the nominal interest
rate. To illustrate, suppose money demand is
interest-elastic. Money demand decreases, in per-
centage terms, more than nominal interest rises.
In steady state, nominal interest rate movements
reflect movements in the inflation rate; recall that
the steady-state real interest rate is 1/β , a con-
stant. In the interest-elastic case, the economy
could be on the wrong side of the Laffer curve.
In other words, seigniorage would decrease
because the tax base (money demand) falls by
more than the tax rate. Interest-inelastic money
demand assures that this does not occur.
12
Evidence supports the conclusion that
greater reliance is correlated with higher infla-
tion. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991)
examine the period 1950–89. They construct an
“economic independence indicator” for a group
of European nations and for each of the four
decades in their sample. (See Table 14 in their
paper.) They estimate the correlation coefficient
between each country’s decade-average infla-
tion rate and the economic independence meas-
ure, finding that countries with more economi-
cally dependent central banks (such as Greece,
Portugal, and Spain) have consistently higher
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What effect would a change in each type
of government paper have on the long-run infla-
tion rate? To answer this, rewrite Equation 14 as
Then an increase in M reduces the inflation rate,
whereas an increase in B increases the inflation
rate. The intuition is clear: money is a cheaper
way to pay off the government’s interest oblig-
ations because the government does not pay
interest on money. On the other hand, an
increase in the stock of bonds requires the cen-
tral bank to eventually raise more revenue, for
a given seigniorage reliance, to meet the in-
creased interest obligations on this debt, thereby
increasing the inflation rate.
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITIES
We can use our setup to answer yet
another important question: Does the composi-
tion of government liabilities (interest-bearing
debt, like bonds, versus non-interest-bearing
debt, like  money) matter? The answer seems
particularly relevant as more and more coun-
tries, including the United States, realize budget
surpluses and pay down their debt.
Define α = M/(M +B). Then it is possible
to rewrite Equation 12 as
Consider a one-for-one exchange in which gov-
ernment bonds are permanently traded for
money. This changes the composition of the
government’s liabilities but not their total value,
M + B. With 0 < φ < 1, an increase in α , for
instance, results in a higher price level.
We next analyze how a change in the
composition of government liabilities affects the
inflation rate. An increase (decrease) in α may
be thought of as representing a less restrictive
(tight) monetary policy.
13 Suppose the govern-
ment initiates a permanent open market pur-
chase of bonds in exchange for money. This
open market operation results in more money
and fewer bonds, that is, α increases. To see the
effect of this on the inflation rate, rewrite
Equation 14 as
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inversely related to movements in α .
14 So, the
composition of government liabilities does mat-
ter. This result has an unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic feel to it.
15 An open market purchase
lowers the eventual interest expenses associated
with interest-bearing government bonds. Conse-
quently, less inflation is needed to fund the
smaller expenses. Hence, inflation declines as
the composition shifts toward money and away
from bonds.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we investigate the effects of
monetary policy decisions that are explicitly
linked to fiscal policy decisions and vice versa.
More important, the nature of the linkage—
here, the government stipulates how much it
will rely on seigniorage to back its long-run
expenses—has direct consequences for the
inflation rate. Our model economy produces the
following prediction: controlling for other fac-
tors, if a country’s reliance on seigniorage
increases, the country’s inflation rate will in-
crease. We go on to show that a permanent
open market purchase (one in which a country
reduces its stock of government bonds and
increases the quantity of money) results in a
decline in the long-run inflation rate.
Our analysis has implications for a classic
question in monetary economics: How much
control can a central bank have over the value of
its currency? (Sargent 1987, 139). We consider
cases in which the central bank is not instrument
independent. These central banks can—via open
market operations—switch the composition of
government liabilities toward non-interest-bear-
ing money and away from debt. We show that
the open market operation lowers debt expenses
and reduces the government’s effective reliance
on seigniorage. This way, it can retain substantial
control over the value of its currency.
In light of our results, we close with two
important questions for future research. First
and foremost, how should φ and α be meas-
ured? This is a difficult issue because φ repre-
sents the fraction of money created to meet 
the government’s financing needs. Governments
typically do not preannounce how much they
will rely on the seigniorage. Consequently, one
must infer how much money is created for
financing needs and how much is created to
meet other central bank activities. Second, what
is the relationship between φ and α ? That is, 
is there a relationship between a country’s 
reliance on seigniorage and its composition of
government liabilities?27 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2000
NOTES
Chapter 4 in Walsh (1998) stimulated many of the
ideas presented here. Part of the work was done when
Bhattacharya visited the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas’ Research Department in the summer of 1999.
We gratefully acknowledge the department’s hospi-
tality and helpful comments from Mark Wynne, Mark
Guzman, and Jim Dolmas.
1 Though they adopt different terminology, Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) focus on a similar
concept. To borrow from their definition, goal indepen-
dence “is the capacity to choose the final goal of
monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of
economic activity.”
2 Alesina and Summers (1993) use slightly different
terminology. Specifically, they assert, “Economic
independence is defined as the ability [of the central
bank] to use instruments of monetary policy without
restrictions. The most common constraint imposed
upon the conduct of monetary policy is the extent to
which the central bank is required to finance govern-
ment deficits. This index of economic independence
essentially measures how easy it is for the government
to finance its deficits by direct access to credit from
the central bank.”
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) in Table 13
of their paper provide some evidence on the Alesina–
Summers instrument-independence indicator. Accord-
ing to them, instrument independence of the central
bank is high in West Germany, Switzerland, the United
States, Austria, and Belgium. Conversely, central
banks in Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Greece, and
Spain have very little instrument independence.
3 Take the example of India. The Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) is definitely politically independent. Nonetheless,
during 1998–99, the net lending by the RBI to the
Indian government was about 10 percent of the gross
fiscal deficit for that year, precipitating an 18 percent
increase in M1.
4 Using data from a large group of countries over 
many years, Fischer (1982) shows that governments
do generate revenue from money creation more often
than not. Click (1998) documents that between 1971
and 1990, in a wide cross section of countries, 
currency seigniorage as percent of GDP ranged 
from 0.3 percent to 14 percent, and seigniorage as
percent of government spending ranged from 1 per-
cent to 148 percent.
5 One implication of our findings is that prohibition of
deficit financing is redundant. For instance, in the
membership requirements put forward by the Euro-
pean Union, there is an upper bound on the debt-to-
GDP ratios. What really matters, and what the central
bank can achieve, is the mandate for price stability.
6 See Feenstra (1986) for a more formal description of
the functional equivalence between models with explicit
transaction costs and those with money-in-the-utility-
function. It is important to mention here that functional
equivalence does not mean that the intuition or
interpretation of the results is model invariant.
7 One may wonder why people hold money here since
they end up consuming only their endowment anyway.
The answer lies in the notion of equilibrium. When
agents solve their individual problems to determine
how much money to hold, they perceive the possibility
of trade in the good and do not know that, in equilib-
rium, they will all simply consume their endowment.
8 For the interested reader, the notion of a steady-state
price level is more fully developed in Walsh (1998),
143–46.
9 Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Smith (1988) contain
good discussions of the doctrine.
10 Alternatively, one could equate bond demand (see
Equation 11) to real bond supply and arrive at the same
expressions for i and π as in Equations 13 and 14.
11 For the interested reader, the optimal policy (one that
maximizes steady-state welfare of agents) would be to
set φ = 0. In words, the household’s welfare is highest
when the government relies solely on lump-sum taxes
to pay for its interest expense. The general flavor of
this result extends to several cases in which distorting
taxes are present. See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
(1996) and Correia and Teles (1999).
12 See Lucas (2000) for an excellent discussion on the
elasticity of money demand. He provides an overview
of the empirical support for the position that money
demand is interest inelastic.
13 Greenwood (1998), for instance, focuses on tight
money policies. As the recent crisis in Japan unfolds,
many commentators are suggesting that the blame
should be placed on the Japanese central bank for
following tight money policies over the last decade,
thereby “strangling’’ the economy. The central bank
argues that its tight money policies have kept
Japanese inflation in check.
14 To verify this, differentiate Equation 16 with respect to
α . The sign of the resulting expression is negative.
15 Sargent (1987) discusses the effect a permanent open
market sale of bonds has on the inflation rate. Given a
fixed deficit, such a sale “bequeaths” a larger stock of
interest-bearing debt to the future; eventually inflation
would have to rise to pay for the outstanding interest
obligations. Sargent and Wallace (1981) called this
paradoxical phenomenon (tight money policies
increase the eventual inflation rate) the “unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic.” See Bhattacharya and Haslag
(1999) for a survey.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 28
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